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Abstract—Existing Global Navigation Satellite Systems
offer no authentication to the open service signals and
so stand-alone receivers are vulnerable to meaconing and
spoofing attacks. These attacks interfere with the integrity
and authenticity of satellite signals: they can delay signals,
or re-broadcast signals. Positioning is thus compromised
and location-based services are at risk. This paper describes
a solution to mitigate this risk. It is a trusted third-party
Localisation Assurance service that informs location-based
services providers up to which level a location claimed
by client can be trusted. It runs several tests over the
localisation data of client receivers and certifies the level
of assurance of locations. An assurance level expresses
the amount of trust the third-party has that a receiver’s
location is calculated from integral and authentic satellite
signals.
Index Terms—GNSS authentication, GNSS spoofing,
meaconing, localisation assurance.
I. INTRODUCTION
Only a few years ago accurate positioning was a pre-
rogative of military and governments. Nowadays, Global
Navigation Systems (GNSS), such as the American GPS,
the Russian alternative GLONASS, and the newcomer
European Galileo, offer free and accurate navigation to
civilians as well.
Free positioning has fostered business and led to a
large number of Location Based Services (LBS). LBS
can, on receiving a client’s location (which client’s
receivers calculate from GNSS) customise the offered
services. For example insurance companies can track
their valuable assets, local authorities can enforce cars
to pay toll-roads, and media organisations can follow
journalists in dangerous zones of the world.
However, civilian location-based services are insecure.
Different from the military and commercial LBS they
use unencrypted GNSS signals and are thus vulnerable
to attacks against navigation signals. Because of such
attacks receivers have no guarantee that the received
GNSS signals come unaltered from legitimate satellites.
As explained in [12] there are good motivations to
attack location-based services, among which financial
gain is the most obvious and important one. Moreover,
navigation messages are transmitted over radio links,
which are insecure channels by their very nature [2].
This makes attacks on signals even easier.
There are three main attacks against GNSS currently
– jamming, spoofing and meaconing. Jamming aims to
prevent receivers in an area from tracking GNSS signals
by broadcasting radio frequency noise. Spoofing targets
at misleading a GNSS receiver by tricking it to lock
onto fake, but appearing legitimate, signals. Even if
it is not successful, spoofing is able to compromise
significantly a receiver’s calculating position, velocity
and time. Meaconing has similar effects as spoofing.
It intercepts, delays and rebroadcasts radio navigation
signals to confuse a GNSS receiver.
In this paper, we concentrate on spoofing because it is
more sophisticated and able to cause more damage than
the other attacks.
At present there are no solutions for LBS providers
to avoid processing spoofed locations. In this paper we
propose one. It is a Localisation Assurance service for
LBS providers. This paper describes the architecture
of the service, which extends a previous architecture
proposed by Harpes et al. [1]. The architecture is able
to manage and run a large and dynamic selection of
checks on GNSS signal integrity and authenticity. It is
not in itself a new algorithm to analyse GNSS signals
and detect spoofing.
Fig. 1 recalls the information flow of our Localisation
Assurance service. A mobile GNSS-enabled user device,
after having computed its location from the received
GNSS signals, sends the location and the navigation
data to the Localisation Assurance Provider (LAP). The
LAP then analyses the navigation data and estimates an
assurance level that represents the amount of confidence
that the LAP has about the location being calculated
from integral and authentic GNSS signals. The higher
the assurance level the more trustworthy the location.
The LAP certifies the assurance level and returns it to the
user device, which forwards it to the LBS provider. LBS
providers can thus deny to serve a request if the location
does not have a sufficiently high level of assurance. A
Public Key Infrastructure is used to validate certificates.
Fig. 1. The information flow with Localisation Assurance.
The work described in this paper relates to the project
“Developing a prototype of Localisation Assurance Ser-
vice Provider (LASP)”, an ESA-funded project executed
by itrust consulting in partnership with the Interdisci-
plinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SnT)
of University of Luxembourg.
II. THE ARCHITECTURE
This section explains the structure of the LAP in terms
of its components and data flow (see Fig. 2). It takes
assessment requests as input and outputs localisation
assurance certificates. An assessment request contains
a user’s location to certify and the navigation data used
in the calculation in the positioning process.
The architecture consists of five interconnected logic
units – the Data Manager (DM), several Security Checks
(SCs), Data Aggregator (DA), the Assurance Level Gen-
erator (AG), and the Certification Manager (CM). We
use “Logic unit” to denote a functionality which can be
implemented, possibly but not necessarily, as a single
software component. Alg. 1 describes briefly the main
module of the LAP. It launches all the above units
that run concurrently. The symbol ‖ stands for parallel
composition of processes.
Fig. 2. The architecture of the LAP.
Algorithm 1 LAP Main
1: DM ‖ (‖i∈{I} (SC i)) ‖ DA ‖ AG ‖ CM
The Data Manager. It inputs assessment requests and
stores, retrieves, and maintains the information that the
other units need to work properly. For example, it
maintains statistics about GNSS signals that a security
check may need. It also updates the false positive and
false negative rates for each security check, which are
required by the Data Aggregator.
The Data Manager also keeps log of intermediate and
final outputs of the units, which can be used in a later
time to control the quality of service. The functionality of
the Data Manager is described in Alg. 2. The algorithm
refers to unspecified parameters (i.e., 〈pi1 , . . . pik〉, αDA,
αCM, and αAG) that are retrieved from an internal
database here not described and then sent to the intended
units. These parameters are specified in the actual im-
plementation of the architecture.
Algorithm 2 Data Manager
1: while true do
2: rq ← receives UserDevice
3: % Receives assessment request
4: for all i ∈ I do
5: 〈 Retrieve SC ’s parameters 〈pi1 , . . . pik 〉 〉;
6: sends SCi(〈rq, 〈pi1 , . . . pik 〉〉);
7: % Sends request and parameters to SCi
8: end for
9: for all x ∈ {DA,CM,AG} do
10: 〈 Retrieves x’s parameters αx 〉;
11: sends x(〈rq, αx〉);
12: % Send request and parameters to unit x
13: end for
14: ω ← receives DA;
15: % Receives partial output
16: c← receives CM;
17: % Receives certificate
18: 〈 Stores 〈rq, αDA, αCM, αAG, ω, c〉 〉;
19: 〈 Run quality control on stored data 〉;
20: end while
Security Checks. Each security check checks for par-
ticular pieces of evidence in favour of or in opposition
to GNSS signal integrity and authenticity. The set of
security checks in the architecture can vary. It is possible
to substitute a security check for another or add a new
security check that is developed by a third party. It is
also possible that certain selections of security checks
are more effective than others.
A security check receives assessment requests. In
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Alg. 3 the strategy that a specific security check SC i
runs is represented by the function f . This function also
distinguishes security checks. Function f takes a list
of parameters as input which are provided by the Data
Manager. Let fp1,...,pk be the function instantiated with
parameters p1, . . . , pk. It processes the assessment re-
quest rq and returns a value that expresses the probability
that a specific observable event caused by an spoofing
attack has occurred. Finally, the security check sends its
output to the Data Aggregator.
Algorithm 3 SecurityCheck SCi
1: while true do
2: 〈rq, 〈p1, . . . , pk〉〉 ← receives DM;
3: % Receives tuning parameters from DM
4: p← fp1,...,pk (rq);
5: % Calculates p
6: sends DA(p); % Send the output to DA
7: end while
The Data Aggregator. It ponders evidence in favour of,
or against, GNSS signal integrity and authenticity. It also
considers the reliability of security checks: the output of
more reliable security checks will have larger weight in
the overall estimation.
The Data Aggregator uses probabilistic conditional
reasoning [13] to build opinions about localisation as-
surance based on the probabilities that certain events
witnessing potential spoofing attacks have happened.
An opinion about GNSS signal integrity and authen-
ticity represents the amount of belief, disbelief, and
uncertainty that property is true. Belief and disbelief
should be derived by evidences in favour of against
GNSS signal integrity and authenticity. It uses the sub-
jective logic [5], which provides operators on opinions.
In the Data Aggregator the opinions from security checks
are first discounted according to security checks’ past
performances, then merged so as to obtain the cumu-
lative opinion that expresses the group consensus about
GNSS signal integrity and authenticity. In this way, Data
Aggregator copes with the uncertainty that might emerge
when some security checks contradicts another or when
there is not enough information to draw a meaningful
conclusion. Alg. 4 describes its main functional steps.
The Assurance Level Generator. It calculates the assur-
ance levels. The assurance level depends on the output
of the Data Aggregator and other pieces of information
such as the user device and the levels recognised by
service providers. Its steps are described in Alg. 5.
The Certification Manager. It prepares the digital
Algorithm 4 Data Aggregator
1: while true do
2: for all i ∈ I do
3: p← receives SCi;
4: % Receives SCi’s output
5: 〈rq, 〈α, α′〉〉 ← receives DM;
6: % Retrieves parameters
7: ωSCi := BUILD(α, p);
8: % Build SCi’s opinion;
9: ωSCi := DISCOUNT(α′, ωSCi );
10: % Discount on SCi’s past reliability
11: end for
12: ω[SCi:i∈I] := MERGE({ωSCi : i ∈ I})
13: % Merge SCi’s opinions
14: sends DM(〈{ωSCi}i∈I , ω[SCi:i∈I]〉);
15: % Send back all result for log
16: end while
Algorithm 5 Assurance Level Generator
1: while true do
2: 〈rq, α〉 ← receives DM;
3: % Receive request and parameters
4: ω ← receives DA;
5: % Receive result
6: al := SETLEVEL(ω, rq, α)
7: % Set assurance level
8: sends CM(al);
9: % Send for certification
10: end while
certificate that contains the assurance level and sends
it back to the user device (see Alg. 6). To compose
the certificate the Certification Manager relies upon an
external Certification Authority and on a Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI).
Algorithm 6 Certification Manager
1: while true do
2: 〈rq, α〉 ← receives AG;
3: % Receive request and parameters
4: c := BUILD(al, rq, α)
5: sends UserDevice(c);
6: % Send back certificate
7: sends DM(c);
8: % Send certificate for log
9: end while
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III. SECURITY CHECKS
We implement a prototype of the LAP with a selec-
tion of security checks, some of which have not been
mentioned in the literature. In this section, we describe
the main methodologies behind them and some details
about their implementation.
We divide the security checks of the LAP into two
sub-classes according to the relation between their output
and GNSS signal integrity and authenticity– sate-based
and transition-based. The former look at instant obser-
vations or measurements. The latter focus on the effects
of the transitions from authentic and non-authentic sig-
nals or vice versa. The current implementation includes
checks that operate on the following strategies:
Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR). This security check
makes use of the power of received signals. Navigation
signals are usually weakened by many factors during
the transmission before reaching receivers. For instance,
obstacles (e.g., trees and buildings) and atmosphere can
block or absorb part of the signal energy. Therefore, the
SNR of received signals should have an upper-bound.
Higher SNR are also possible in some rare cases. For
example, constructive multipath may happen and the
direct and reflected waves add in-phase which results
in an increase of the SNR.
We estimate the reference levels (i.e., the upper
bounds) for each satellite identified by the pseudo-
random numbers (PRN) in terms of elevation angles.
We make use of a dataset of the SNR of signals captured
during static and mobile observations. The maximal SNR
occurred in the dataset is chosen as the reference level for
the signals from a satellite at a certain elevation angle.
To capture the unpredictable influences that increases
SNR, we construct a function called half-Gaussian
which decreases the belief in the output as the observed
SNR moves away from the reference level.
Doppler. There are two strategies to make use of
Doppler. The straightforward one is to check if the
measured Doppler shift agrees with constellation and
user dynamics (e.g., velocity). Thus, we need to calcu-
late a reference to compare with a user’s measurement
which depends on the velocities of satellites and the
user. A satellite’s velocity can be computed as the time
derivative of the function mapping time to the satellites’
positions [9]. The reference Doppler shift is plausible
if the user’s real velocity is available since Doppler
shift is proportional to the projection of the satellite’s
relative velocity in the user’s direction. However, a user’s
velocity reported in a request is computed by the receiver
which makes use of measured Doppler shifts. If such
a velocity is used and the attacker uses an updated
almanac, the reference will always be the same as the
one measured by the receiver. Thus, we cannot use
this strategy unless users have other ways to correctly
measure their velocity.
The second strategy makes use of the coherence
between the measured Doppler shifts of signals from
a satellite but with different frequencies. This is be-
cause the relative velocity between a satellite and a
user remains the same for different frequencies and the
ratio between these frequencies is constant. For example,
the ratio r between GPS L1 and L2 frequencies is
1575.42/1227.60 = 1.283(3). We observe that 99.6%
of the ratios lie within the interval r ± 0.001. The
limitation of this strategy is that receivers must support
multiple frequencies, which is not the case for most of
the commercial receivers.
Navigation data. Satellites keep broadcasting navigation
data to receivers in a low bit rate, e.g., 50 bit/s for
GPS L1 C/A. The navigation data changes from time to
time but when it changes cannot be always predicted.
For instance, the almanac fields are updated every 2
or 3 days, the ephemeris every few hours and the
time field every second. Therefore, a less sophisticated
attacker may not observe the change and sends signals
with the old navigation data. A mismatch of the data
in received signals and the real-time data indicates a
possible spoofing attack.
In our implementation, we refer to EDAS (EGNOS
Data Access Service) reference stations to fetch the real-
time navigation data as it broadcasts them through the
Internet.
Visible satellites. We verify if satellites reported by a
user’s assessment request are visible at the place where
the user claims to be. For a position and a time point,
only a subset of satellites are visible and only these
satellites are expected to be reported by the user.
In our implementation, we calculates the positions
of satellites the up-to-date almanac, from with we can
further learn their elevation angles. In practice, receivers
discard signals from satellites with lower elevation than
a pre-defined threshold called elevation mask. The ele-
vation mask varies between receivers. We suggest users
disable elevation mask so that all the originating satel-
lites of received signals are reported.
Ground height. The claimed position of a user should
be close to the Earth’s surface. In other words, a position
that is 1,000 meters away above the ground is impossible
for a user travelling by car. Such claims are possible
when a non-intelligent attacker may only focus on how
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to fool a receiver to lock a different place in the 2-
dimension space but ignore the height. In this case, it
is possible that the height does not correspond to that of
a valid position.
The general idea to implement this check is to
validate the third component of a position based on
the first two. For positions within Luxembourg terri-
tory, the reference ground height can be requested at
http://map.geoportail.lu. However, as only
Eastings/Northings coordinates are accepted, we first
convert coordinates from WGS84 to Hayford and then
project them using the Transverse Mercator algorithm. In
our implementation, we take general cases into account
such as driving over a bridge or standing on a building.
The maximum allowed ground height is set to 20 meters.
In other words, users would not ask certification for their
locations with a height larger than 20 meters above the
ground.
Clock bias. Monitoring clock bias is considered as a
technique to detect advanced spoofing attacks [14]. We
design an algorithm that is able to detect clock bias.
Tests with a signal repeater in a controlled environment
show that the clock monitoring algorithm can detect the
beginnings and the ends of attacks even if the average
delay introduced is about 80 nanoseconds. This attributes
to not only the efficiency of the algorithm but also the
stable and noiseless nature of receivers’ clock. When a
COTS smartphone is used, we find that a bias magnitude
of about 100 ms is required to enable the detection.
The results of this security check constitute a major
achievement of the project. Additional details can be
found in [7].
Receiver autonomous integrity monitoring (RAIM)
This security check assesses the integrity of GNSS
signals using redundant pseudorange measurements. For
receivers performing RAIM analysis, it’s possible to give
an indication about the consistency of pseudoranges us-
ing redundant measurements. The presence of a spoofing
attack can result in the absence of integrity detected by
the receiver. The use of a multifrequency receiver for
our tests permit the decrease of the alarm limit to values
about 50 - 100 meters resulting in RAIM processing of
at least 75 of the time.
Consistency with other positioning sources – WiFi.
WiFi access points can be used as an alternative way
to localise users when GNSS signals are not available.
Given observed WiFi access points, we can have an area
where all their signals can be received. This area is
calculated based on a dataset recording access points’
geographic positions. Intuitively, when a localisation
process is consistent with WiFi positioning, then the
location computed by the receiver should be inside the
corresponding WiFi area computed. This is because if an
access point can be observed, then the real location must
be in an area where the signals of the access point can
reach. We use this observation, under the assumption that
WiFi signals are not targeted by any spoofing attacks, to
evaluate the quality of the reported localisation process.
Reachability. The reachability check is used to test
whether two consecutive locations from a user are reach-
able with the maximum speed allowed by his way of
travelling (e.g., on foot, by car or by air). This security
check cannot be used to indicate directly the assurance
level of users’ locations in their requests. This is because
the assurance of the previous location is unknown. How-
ever, if two consecutive locations are found unreachable,
then we can conclude that the sources of the signals has
been changed. This change may happen when attackers
terminate a spoofing or attackers start a new one.
Time check. The time check explores the fact that GNSS
positioning information includes a reference time, which
is sometimes used as time-stamps in many applications.
The request of a user includes the time and date cal-
culated based on the satellites navigation message but
not on the receiver’s internal clock. The LAP verifies
the time stamp and gives a low opinion if it mentions
a future event or a distant event in the past. Standard
communication network delays are accepted.
IV. DISCUSSION: COMBINING SECURITY CHECKS.
In Sect. II we explained how the Data Aggregator
combines the outputs of the security checks. The Data
Aggregator, first transforms each security check’s output
into an opinion about localisation integrity and authen-
ticity. Then it discounts this opinion by considering
the reputation of the security check according to the
security check’s trustworthiness in the current context,
and finally it merges all security checks’ opinions to
obtain a communal conclusion.
This method can be applied straightforwardly to those
security checks whose output is a probability about an
observable events caused by an attack. If this is not
the case, that is, if the relation between the event’s
occurrence and the presence of an attack is not direct,
the strategy must be adapted to draw correct conclusions
from the security check’s output.
The security check “clock-bias” is peculiar in this
sense. A change in the clock-bias is observed when an
attack begins or when an attack has ended. In order to be
meaningfully interpreted the clock-bias security check’s
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output needs to be compared with what the other security
checks have found in the previous run. If the general
opinion was that there was no spoofing, a change in the
clock-bias quite likely implies the start of an attack. This
reinforces the relevance of the security checks that at the
current time are detecting the presence of a spoofing, but
it weakens the relevance of those that are not detecting
any.
Whether the reasoning should be adapted or can be
applied as it is, is something that should be decided
before adding any new security check to the LAP.
V. EXPERIMENTAL VALIDATION
We validate our system by performing a series of tests
at ESA ESTEC labs making use of sophisticated signal
generators. The equipment is composed of a Spirent
GSS-7700 simulator, connected to a dedicated software
that controls the parameters of the simulator. A GNSS
receiver is also used to provide feedback of the simulated
signals to the controlling software.
At the beginning of the test session, the simulator does
not provide signals aligned to the live constellation and
the detection is straightforward. The following security
checks are able to immediately detect that signals are
not authentic:
• Satellite plausibility;
• Absolute Doppler;
• Time check;
• Consistency with WiFi.
In the second attempt, we increase the satellites’
power. The absolute power security check starts to detect
that there were satellites with SNR values higher than
usual.
In the third test, we upload the correct almanac and set
the time of the simulator. The time is manually set and
the resulting difference between GPS time and simulator
time is smaller than one second. Then, only consistency
with WiFi security check was able to detect the presence
of simulated signals. After setting the simulated position
to the real position of the User Device (computer) it
becomes consistent with the WiFi localisation and the
assurance level returns to the maximal one.
In this scenario, the clock bias security checks cannot
detect the presence of simulated signals. This security
check only detects the transition between two different
sources of signals, and then, the continuous broadcast of
simulated signals remains undetectable.
Because the functionality to perfectly align simulated
signals with live signals is not available, we make use
of the multipath simulation capabilities of the simulator.
The idea is to simulate a set of signals (A) and a
corresponding set of delayed replicas (B), in the same
way as in multipath with a reflected wave arriving with
some delay to the receiving antenna. This situation is
more realistic than switching between live and simulated
signals because in a real attack scenario, the receiver will
continuously receive live signals, as long as it has an
open view to the sky. The attack is deployed as follows:
• Feed the receiver with a set of signals (A) at 10 dB
waiting until the receiver locks;
• Start increasing the power of the replicas (B) from
-50 dB (minimum power) to 20 dB (maximum
power) at a rate of 0.5 dB/s.
• Decrease the original signals (A) from 10 dB to -50
dB at the same rate.
The smallest delay tested was 100 ns and it was
successfully detected by the clock bias security check.
VI. PRIVACY ISSUES
LAP implements mechanisms to protect user’s privacy
in agreement with the current EU directives on e-privacy
and on data protection. In the architecture that we have
so far described, LAP and LBS providers learn user
whereabouts. It is well known that from locations and
movements it is possible to learn sensitive and private
information such as home addresses. LAP employs an
ad-hoc solution that has been designed in the scope of the
project; it is called selective location blinding [6]. Users
control up to which level of granularity service providers
will know about their locations. This control is exerted
without compromising the location assurance certificate
on the fully detailed location. In fact, service providers
received certified encrypted locations, but are users that
control up to which degree of accuracy locations can be
decrypted. We remand to [6] for details.
VII. RELATED WORK
Several solutions aiming to discern spoofed signals
have been studied in the literature. Because this paper
focuses primarily on GNSS-enabled devices we do not
report on works addressing differential GPS spoofing,
which targets ground-based reference stations [4]. In-
stead, we report on works that study how to protect
GNSS receivers for civilian users. Wen et al. in [15]
propose and comment nine strategies that, in theory, can
succeed in detecting specific instances of spoofing at-
tacks. These strategies run in stand-alone GPS receivers
and are named as follows: absolute signal power, signal
power changing rate, relative signal strengths, range
rate, Doppler shift, correlation peaks, range difference,
ephemeris data, and signal power. All these strategies
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have limitations and are applicable under specific condi-
tions. Other methods cannot be implemented in software
in a single device. We refer here to those techniques that
require, for example, the installation of special antennas
(e.g., [8]) or algorithms that cross-check current signals
with other observations, for example, as done in [3].
In this latter work the interaction between the authentic
and the spoofing correlation peaks is used to distinguish
spoofed from authentic signals even when they are
almost aligned. Spoofing signals from a single source are
also likely to be spatially correlated while the authentic
signals are not. Another spoofing detection technique is
described by Nielsen et al. [10]: here the correlation
is observed while monitoring signal characteristics like
signal-strength or Doppler shift.
All the previous works, and others that similarly
describe strategies for spoofing detection, can be used
in our security checks. They can be plugged in our
architecture. However, none of them propose to combine
different spoofing-detection strategies in a service for
location assurance. Speaking of new services for GNSS
devices, Pozzobon [11] proposes to integrate in the
GNSS a new authentication scheme. Here, the solution to
spoofing is not detecting attacks after they have struck
but avoiding that attacks strike at all. This should be
possible by setting up a service that supplies satel-
lites authentication for civilians (presently, authentication
is available only for military and governmental use).
This paper embarks in an opposite direction to that by
Pozzobon: not modifying the current GNSS protocols,
which requires the agreement of GNSS owners, but using
GNSS as it is while still providing a service that supports
location integrity.
In [1] the authors propose an architecture as a possible
solution for location assurance that does not require any
changes to the signals’ structure. It analyses the threats
and explains how the existence of such a service might
provide localisation integrity to civilian users.
This paper is where the need for a Location Assurance
Provider has been first raised. The paper says “a third
party Location Assurance Provider (LAP) [is] respon-
sible for the analysis of information sent by a Secure
Galileo Receiver (SGR). The information to be analysed
includes clock bias, signal strengths of the available
satellites and previous localisations. The LAP checks
additional information such as previous attacks, reliabil-
ity of the SGR clock, audit log of the SGR, plausibility
with respect to previous localisations, plausibility with
respect to a map and information on the integrity of the
Galileo satellites.” The proposed LAP is also assumed
to return a certificate to the user device that is bound
to the previously received data set and that contains an
assurance level. Therefore the need of such a service has
been already presented. However, in [1] the analysis and
decision criteria performed at the LAP are not addressed
or disclosed. A few mechanisms called security checks,
known in the literature as spoofing countermeasures,
are cited as possible technical algorithms to detect the
presence of attacks, but no proposal about whether to
combine those security checks or how to combine them
has been not even hinted. The present work instead goes
further and proposes a possible detailed architecture for
the LAP.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
LAP is an innovative service that is available for
private and institutional end-users and provides assur-
ance levels on localisations calculated using open GNSS
signals. This paper has presented a design for LAP. The
design is made of five modules. The most important ones
are the security checks, which test for spoofing attacks,
and the data aggregator, which copes with contradictions
and combines their outputs into a consistent evaluation
of localisation trust. The implementation and the tests
that we have run so far, shows that LAP is effective
in certifying locations from GNSS signal integrity and
authenticity.
As future work we are considering to add more
sophisticated security checks in our architecture. We
are currently adapting and testing the architecture to
work in the mobile network. This is a significant variant
of the architecture considering the recent increase of
GPS-enabled smartphones and the proliferation of LBS
applications for Android smartphones.
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